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HR6875FEDERALSession 119Federal Billin committee

High Impact

AI OVERWATCH Act

Last action · January 21, 2026: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 2.Sponsors: Brian Mast and 43 others

Bill progressHistory & official text ↓

Introduced

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What This Bill Would Do

This bill mandates that companies obtain a specific government license before exporting, re-exporting, or transferring high-performance computer chips to certain countries identified as national security concerns. It establishes strict technical criteria for which chips are covered and requires the Department of Commerce to certify that these exports will not support foreign military or intelligence capabilities.

Why it matters

This bill would restrict the global supply chain for advanced AI-capable semiconductors by requiring federal approval for shipments to countries like China, Russia, and Iran, potentially impacting U.S. technology companies' export revenues and global market access.

Who It Would Affect

Groups the bill's text would affect if enacted, as described in the record. Being affected is not a position for or against it.

Directly affected

U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturers

Companies must undergo a 30-day congressional notification process and obtain specific licenses to export high-performance chips to designated countries.

Directly affected

Data Center Operators in Countries of Concern

Access to high-performance U.S.-made integrated circuits becomes subject to federal export licensing requirements.

Key Facts

Requires a specific license for the export, re-export, or in-country transfer of 'covered integrated circuits' to entities in designated countries of concern.
Defines 'countries of concern' as China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela (under the Maduro regime).
Defines 'covered integrated circuits' based on specific processing performance thresholds (e.g., 4,800+ total processing performance) or bandwidth capabilities (e.g., 1,400+ GB/s DRAM bandwidth).
Excludes chips not designed or marketed for use in data centers from the license requirement.

Show all 9 facts

Prohibits the use of 'general licenses' to bypass the individual application requirement.
Requires the Under Secretary of Commerce to notify Congress at least 30 days before approving any such license.
Mandates that license applications include certifications that the end-user does not support the military, intelligence, or cyber capabilities of the country of concern.
Requires certification that the export will not negatively impact the supply of chips available to U.S. persons.
Allows the Under Secretary to update technical parameters for covered chips 18 months after a national security strategy is submitted to Congress, subject to majority approval by the Operating Committee for Export Policy.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which countries are affected by these export restrictions?

The bill lists China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela (under the Maduro regime) as countries of concern.

Does this apply to all computer chips?

No. It only applies to 'covered s,' which are defined by specific high-performance processing and bandwidth thresholds, and are intended for use in data centers.

Can companies get a general license to export these chips?

No. The bill explicitly prohibits the Under Secretary of Commerce from issuing s for these specific items.

What else do you want to know?

News Coverage

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Where This Stands

Currently in committee. The next step in the legislative lifecycle is Floor Vote.

Procedural history

4 actions

Jan 21, 2026HouseCommittee
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 2.
Jan 21, 2026House
Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
Dec 18, 2025HouseCommittee
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Dec 18, 2025HouseIntroduced
Introduced in House

Version history

Only one version on file - nothing to compare yet. As later stages (committee substitute, engrossed, enrolled) are captured, the redline appears here.

View official text →

Full breakdown

Who this bill affects and the strongest case for and against it, written only from the bill’s own text.

Discoveries

1 pattern noticed across the record

Patterns POLISCOPE noticed across the record. These are observations to investigate, not conclusions.

policy shift90% confidence

Tightening of Export Licensing

The bill removes the possibility of using 'general licenses' for high-performance chips, forcing a move toward individual, case-by-case federal review for all exports to listed countries.

Department of Commerce

Connected Entities

Rick Crawford, Bill Huizenga, Moolenaar, John and 5 more

PersonRick Crawford“U.S. Representative and co-sponsor.”Map →

PersonBill Huizenga“U.S. Representative and co-sponsor.”Map →

PersonMoolenaar, John“U.S. Representative and co-sponsor.”Map →

PersonDarin LaHood“U.S. Representative and co-sponsor.”Map →

PersonKeith Self“U.S. Representative and co-sponsor.”Map →

OrganizationDepartment of Commerce“Responsible for enforcing the license requirements.”Map →

PersonBrian Mast“U.S. Representative who introduced the bill.”Map →

PersonYoung Kim“U.S. Representative and co-sponsor.”Map →

Sources

Open source document

www.congress.gov

Analysis Score

0–100

Significance85
How much this matters to a regular citizen
Controversy75
Intensity of disagreement among stakeholders
Entertainment20
Compellingness for a non-policy-wonk reader
Buzz60
Current news / social attention level

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